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WHO PAYS FOR BANKING SUPERVISION? 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES  
 





This paper focuses on the financing of banking supervision. Countries are classified according to 
who finances banking supervision – the tax payer and/or the supervised industry -, and how the 
budget and fees are determined. We show that funding regimes differ across countries. Public 
funding is more often found when banks are supervised by the central bank, while supervision 
funded via a levy on the regulated banks is more likely in the case of a separate financial authority. 
Finally, some countries apply mixed funding. In general, there is a trend toward more private 
funding. We also find a relation between sources of financing and accountability arrangements. 
Public financing is associated with accountability towards the parliament, while private financing is 
more likely to go hand in hand with accountability towards the government. The financing issue is 
important because the financing regime may affect the behaviour of the supervisor and hence the 
quality of supervision. Regulatory capture, industry capture and the supervisor’s self interest may 
affect supervisory policy.  No theoretical model  has been developed  prescribing the optimal 
financing of supervision. Our results suggest that the actual choice of financing is a casual one, not 
based on either considerations of incentive-compatability or on the beneficiary approach. As it is to 
be expected that financial regulation will become more internationally organized in the future, 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, many countries have witnessed changes in the architecture of banking 
supervision. Sometimes the institutional change was triggered by a banking crisis, which harmed 
the reputation of the supervisor. But also, policymakers were pressed to rethink the supervisory 
regimes due to changes in the structure of the financial industry in their country, brought about by 
mergers between banks and insurance companies (conglomeration), internationalisation of the 
financial sector and the blurring of distinctions between various types of financial institutions and 
products.
2 In a number of countries, there is still an ongoing debate about whether the supervisory 
structure should be reformed, and if so, in what direction. An example is Italy, where in 2005 the 
Parliament discussed the “hybrid” supervisory institutional setting, introduced a marginal reform of 
the antitrust responsibilities, reduced central bank involvement and shortened the Governor’s term 
of office. 
 
Not only the architecture of financial supervision, but also its financing structure differs among 
countries. Moreover, it has seen changes over time. Thus, in the Netherlands, the change in the 
architecture of supervision was in 2004 accompanied by a change in the financing structure: the 
system of full public funding was gradually replaced by a mixed system using seignorage as well as 
levies on the supervised industries (Mooij and Prast, 2001; Van der Zwet, 2003). In general, there 
seems to be a trend away from public and towards private financing of bank supervision.  
 
The academic literature has thus far paid only little attention to who pays and who should pay for 
banking supervision, an exception being Quintyn and Taylor (2003, 2004). The purpose of this 
paper is to provide a first step in contributing to filling this gap by presenting an international 
comparison of financing regimes in a large set of countries. Our data consist on information on the 
sources of financing of banking supervisors worldwide from various sources, including the BIS 
Governance Network. . In addition, we have carried out a survey which contained questions about 
the source of financing, budgetary procedures and accountability practices. We gathered 20 
responses which we have used to supplement the other data.
3 
 
                                                 
2 The role of the financial blurring effect in explaining the reform of the supervisory architecture is highlighted in 
Grunbichler (2005) for Austria, Schuler (2005) for Germany, Prast (2005) for The Netherlands.  Masciandaro (2005 and 
2006) performed empirical analyses on the determinants of supervisory reforms, checking the robustness of the 
financial blurring effect. 
 
3  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) also provide a detailed database. 
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Our analysis is limited to the financing of prudential supervision of banks, although we are aware 
that changes in the structure of the financial industry would also require the analysis of insurance 
and securities supervision. In fact, many countries have integrated financial supervision of the three 
sectors, including in some instances the supervision of pension funds.  Being limited to banks´ 
prudential supervision, this paper should therefore be regarded as an initial contribution to a more 
comprehensive analysis of the budgetary governance of financial sector supervision.
4  
 
Of course, other questions are also relevant in the analysis of budgetary independence. For example, 
is there any optimal financing model of supervision, and can the performance and stability of 
individual institutions, and the financial system as a whole, be explained by the financing structure 
of supervision? Is there any correlation between accountability practices and sources of financing? 
What does the process of internationalisation imply for the financing structure? We will leave these 
questions for future research, but touch upon them briefly in the remainder of this paper.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses possible ways to address the issue of the 
financing structure of banking supervision. Section 3 describes the overall supervisory architecture 
in a number of countries, paying particular attention to the financing rules. Section 4 presents 
evidence on supervisory accountability practices for a subset or our sample. Our data consist of 
information about the financing structure of 90 banking institutions (central banks, specialised 
supervisory agencies, single financial authorities). Our main conclusions and directions for future 
research are presented in section 5.   
 
 
2.  The importance of the issue of financing supervision: principal–agent, industry capture,  
political interference issues  
 
Before turning, in section 3, to the empirical question who does pay for supervision, we will briefly 
touch upon the theoretical issue of who should pay for supervision. The issue of the financing of 
banking supervision is relevant first and foremost because the financing regime of supervision may 
affect the behaviour of the supervisor and hence the quality of supervision. This is where the issues 
of supervisory independence, regulatory capture, and principal agent theory come into play.  
                                                 
4  By limiting ourselves to prudential supervision, we overlook conduct-of-business supervision, which, in some 
countries, is carried out by the same institution as the one responsible for prudential supervision. Market conduct 
supervision has become more important in the face of recent scandals in which individual market participants have been 
harmed.  
 4 
From a microeconomic perspective, one might argue that the beneficiaries should pay. Individual 
bank depositors and other bank stakeholders benefit from micro prudential supervision, as this is a 
form of consumer protection. In fact, micro prudential supervision can be regarded as monitoring 
which is delegated by bank depositors to the supervisory authority. Taking this point of view, 
financing of supervision by the banks – who would pass on the bill to their customers – would seem 
to be desirable.
5 However, there is no doubt that society as a whole benefits from financial stability, 
which is fostered by prudential supervision and by the central bank role of the lender of last resort 
(Van der Zwet and Swank, 2000). This would make a case for tax-financed banking supervision. 
When considering the pros and cons of financing, the degree of distortions of the tax system should 
also play a role. The more distortionary tax financing is, the less likely it would seem that, ceteris 
paribus, supervision paid by taxes is the optimal choice for society.  
 
Theoretically relevant as the beneficiary approach to public and/or private financing of supervision 
may be, we do not believe this to be the most relevant issue. Tax payers and bank depositors are 
theoretically distinct, but in practice largely overlapping categories of citizens. In developed 
societies, no household can do without a bank account and all households pay taxes, directly 
(income, wealth) and indirectly (VAT). Those who have high bank deposits are most likely the ones 
who also pay high taxes, hence the burden would in any case fall mostly on them – although 
depending on the bracket structure of the income tax system, higher incomes and wealthier people 
may be better off with private financing. Hence, although principally relevant, the beneficiary 
approach does not have major practical implications. In our view, it can be circumvented by 
assuming that 1) citizens need to be a bank client, 2) tax payers and depositors are almost identical 
groups, and 3) society as a whole benefits from prudential supervision.
6   
 
Note, that the beneficiary approach and the principal-agent approach are intertwined, as in general 
the principal is precisely the one whose interests should be safeguarded. To our knowledge, no 
theoretical model has been developed to analyze h ow banking supervision should be financed. 
Moreover, no theoretical explanations have been offered to explain existing financing structures. 
This is not surprising, as little attention has been paid to these financing structures. However, there 
is some related literature that may be relevant in the light of the subject of this paper.  
  
                                                 
5 Note, however, that there is a potential conflict is that between the objectives of macro- and micro-prudential 
regulation, more precisely between stability of the banking system as a whole on the one hand, and the health and 
efficiency of individual banks on the other (Crockett, 2001). 
6 However, regulation may also be costly in terms of growth. See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) for a case study 
of Italy. 5 
Thus, Alesina and Tabellini (2004) have studied which policy tasks should be carried out by 
politicians, and which should be delegated to “bureaucrats”. They argue, that from the point of view 
of society it is optimal to let bureaucrats rather than politicians carry out tasks that have the 
following characteristics: a) they require a high degree of specific technical ability relative to effort, 
b) ex post preferences of the public are clear and no large flexibility is needed, c) time inconsistency 
is an issue, and d) powerful vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome. Alesina and 
Tabellini conclude that in practice delegation usually does not meet these optimal criteria. Alesina 
and Tabellini (2005) show that this can be explained by assuming that politicians maximize the 
probability of rents from office holding, rather than social welfare. Politicians will hold on to 
policies that increase their probability of re-election, and delegate risky policies to bureaucracies to 
be able to shift the risk (and blame) on to them.  
 
Banking supervision seems to fit the optimal delegation criteria rather well– technical ability is 
needed, public preferences are rather clear, there is a time inconsistency problem because there is an 
incentive for forbearance. Also, depending on the structure of the financial sector, the banking 
sector may be a highly organized powerful interest group.
7  Banking supervision also has 
characteristics that make delegation to bureaucrats attractive for policy makers tehmselves. It has a 
high reputation risk  - bank failures harm depositors and may therefore reduce re-election 
probabilities. The fact that both from the point of view of society and from that of politicians 
delegation is attractive may explain why we see that in practice supervision is indeed often 
delegated to bureaucrats.  
 
In fact, already in 1997 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognized the importance of 
political independence of prudential supervisors in the “Core Principles for Effective Bank 
Supervision” (BIS, 1997). In practice we do see that almost everywhere, and certainly in the 
industrial world, banking supervision is placed at a distance of the government and is delegated to 
what Alesina and Tabellini (2004) would label bureaucrats.
8 Recent literature (Quintyn and Taylor 
2002, 2003 and 2004; Das, Quintyn and Chenard, 2004 and Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor, 2005) 
confirms that the responsibility for prudential supervision should be delegated to an independent 
agency, provided that this agency has defined clear objectives and political independence, disposes 
                                                 
7 The delegation approach has been recently used to debate financial supervisory issues in Bjerre- Nielsen (2004). There 
are two theoretical models on banking supervision architecture – Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2004)  - but 
without any explicit identification and discussion of the policymaker (lawmaker) objective function. 
8 Recent changes in Poland indicate that financial supervision is under close scrutiny of politicians.  6 
of adequate supervisory instruments to achieve these objectives, and is held accountable to ensure 
checks and balances.  
 
Still, even with supervision placed outside the government, the actual independence of the 
supervisor may differ. According to Quintyn and Taylor (2004), supervisory independence has four 
dimensions 1) regulatory independence, associated with a wide autonomy in setting prudential rules 
and regulations; 2) supervisory independence from political interference and industry intimidation; 
3) institutional autonomy associated with the security of tenure of supervisors; their legal protection 
against court proceedings stemming from measures adopted in the performance of their functions in 
good faith and the appropriate governance structure, and decision making processes which should 
be subjected to scrutiny from the public and the industry, and 4) budgetary  or financial 
independence (Quintyn and Taylor, 2004). 
 
Focusing on the fourth dimension, it is obvious that even with delegation, there is the risk that 
politicians, through the financing regime, interfere with supervisory policy, thereby potentially 
harming the quality of supervision. An implicit contract between the government and the banking 
supervisor – a government driven contract - could exist within the framework of the grabbing hand 
theory (Shleifer and Vishy, 1998).
9 According to this theory, the contract would be designed to 
extract short term political rent from supervision. For example, the government may put pressure on 
the supervisor not to close a bank, as bank closure comes at a political cost, with depositors and 
possibly taxpayers being harmed (Quintyn and Taylor, 2002).  
 
In addition to the risk of political interference with supervision, with the policy maker maximizing 
individual rather than social welfare, two other risks are potentially threatening the quality of 
supervision. There is the risk of regulatory capture by the supervised industry - the industry driven 
implicit contract. An implicit contract between the banking industry – as a vested interest group – or 
even between individual banks, and the prudential supervisor, is in line with the classic capture 
theory, which provides the analytical framework for any implicit contract between supervised 
institutions and their supervisors (Stigler, 1971). By identifying with the supervised institutions, or 
by being dependent on them, the supervisor may be tempted to serve the specific interests of the 
regulated firm(s). Note, however, that Alesina and Tabellini (2004) conclude that delegation is 
                                                 
9 The risks of political capture can emerge, given an institutional delegation framework that attributes financial 
supervision tasks to independent un-elected bureaucrats. The institutional design problem is analysed in Alesina and 
Tabellini (2004) from a society’ welfare maximization point of view, while Alesina and Tabellini (2005) investigate the 
politicians’ point of view, which have to decide what to delegate to bureaucrats and what to retain for themselves. 7 
optimal in the case of powerful vested interests. Obviously, banks have incentives to resist both 
general prudential supervisory action and actions taken to limit activities of their individual 
institution. In the case of banking supervision, this may be for example by softer prudential 
regulatory requirements, special accounting rules, and forbearance in general  
 
Finally, there is the risk that the bureaucrat pursuits his self interest rather than that of society. This 
self interest may be his reputation, and it has been argued that this may result in regulatory 
forbearance (self bureaucrat capture, see Kane (1990), Boot and Thakor (1993)). The supervisor's 
behaviour could also be consistent with the “career concern model” as presented by Alesina and 
Tabellini (2004, 2005). Thus, the supervisor may aim at a future career in the banking sector or in 
politics, which may affect his current supervisory policy. This risk is more important in the case of 
more independence and should be countered by accountability measures and a mandate. This is why 
we will supplement our findings on the financing regime cum e vidence on the general and 
budgetary accountability practices in a sub sample of countries (see section 4).  
 
Obviously the interests of the government and/or the banking firms can capture the supervisor 
through the influence on its self interest, for example its career and financial reward. Alternatively, 
the banking industry capture could be an indirect case of political capture, or vice versa.  In other 
words, the grabbing hand theory, the capture theory and the career concern theory can be deeply 
intertwined.  This may be countered by transparency and accountability procedures on the 
supervisor's activities.
10 Note, however, that transparency is not by definition a good thing when it 
comes to independence and the quality of policy. Thus, ECB minutes are not made public out of 
fear that ECB Board members may be influenced by national policy makers. As for banking 
supervision, some argue that is is optimal not to reveal which banks have received warnings and/or 
fines by the supervisor, because that might result in panic and a self fulfilling prophecy.  
 
The ideal supervisor’s explicit contract with society should be designed so that an implicit 
government-driven contract and an industry driven contract are difficult to establish. Moreover, it 
should be incentive-compatible: the supervisor should face incentives that induce it to maximize 
social welfare.   
 
Using the financing regime as an instrument, one theoretical way to deal with the principal-agent 
and capture problems might be to link the budget of the supervisory agency (and the remunerations 
                                                 
10 Lastra and Shams (2001) examine the interrelationship between accountability and transparency and provide a 
definition of the latter. 8 
of its managers) to performance. This would generate incentive-compatibility and make 
accountability less important: the supervisor would be provided with incentives that induce him to 
take decisions that are optimal for the principal (society as a whole). However, this is not easy to 
achieve, first of all because it is extremely difficult to find robust performance indicators of 
financial supervision, let alone indicators that are also useful for performance-linked budgeting 
purposes. For example, if the supervisor is rewarded for the absence of bank failures, it has an 
incentive to keep an unsound bank open. On the other hand, one cannot imagine rewarding a 
supervisor according to the number of closed banks. Moreover, it is not always clear that 
performance of the banking sector can be fully attributed to, or could have been prevented by, the 
supervisory authorities. Despite these practical problems, some countries  – notably, the UK, 
Sweden, Australia and the Netherlands (see their websites and annual reports) - have tried or are 
trying to develop performance indicators, without however aiming to link the supervisor’s 
remuneration to these indicators.
11 In sum, optimal financing rules might be able to contribute to the 
supervisor giving an incentive to fulfil its task.   
 
Quintyn and Taylor (2004) claim that political independence remains the prime concern from the 
point of view of financial stability. Their conclusion is based on the empirical analysis of recent 
financial crises in developing countries where policymakers tried to interfere with the supervisory 
activity. In our view, however, it is an open question whether this conclusion applies to developed 
countries. A universally optimal model of financing prudential supervision may not exist because of 
the diversity of country-specific factors (e.g. political, legal and institutional traditions). For 
example, the more the banking sector is organised as a vested interest group, the less attractive it 
may be to use the banks as the source of supervisory financing. Alternatively, if the checks and 
balances on the political system are weak, potential political interference on banks´ supervision 
makes public financing less attractive. 
12 
 
It should be clear by now that the financing issue of supervision is relevant for other than 
beneficiary-considerations. Having said this, we leave the optimal model of financing for future 
research, and it is our guess that the optimal financing regime may depend on country 
                                                 
11  The Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) proposes a general framework that links 
its two strategic goals (to contribute to public confidence and to safeguard from undue loss) with different performance 
measurements (number of involuntary closures of financial institutions initiated by OSFI, OSFI’s treatment of 
companies in difficulty, etc.) for accountability purposes (see OSFI 2005). In England, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) presents a Business Plan, which explains its priorities and commits to allocate and use resources in an efficient 
way, setting the budgetary levels of expenditure and the relative plan for funding (see FSA, 2004 and 2005). 
12 Note that this paper does not attempt to respond to the question of how much should be paid for supervision. This 
issue is relevant, but beyond the scope of this paper.  
 9 
characteristics. Rather, we will use our data base to assess actual structures of the financing of 
banking supervision.  
 
 
  3.   Supervisory Architectures and Financing Rules: A Cross – Country Overview  
 
A financially independent supervisor is one that possesses the necessary resources to pursue its 
mandate, without any veto player interference.
13 The veto player can be a political body (political 
capture risk) or the supervised institutions (industry capture risk) or both. Consequently the degree 
of financial independence from politicians is higher the lower the role of politicians – as taxpayers´ 
representatives – in determining the size and use of the supervisor's budget (public funding). On the 
other hand, the risk of regulatory capture may be higher with industry funding. Moreover, there 
might be a link between the supervisors’ policy and its funding because of the capacity of the 
supervisor to impose penalties and fees on the supervised institutions. This requires special 
accountability provisions. It needs to be highlighted that an additional advantage of industry 
financing is that fees could be risk-based. In this case, banks that have a high risk profile and need 
more monitoring pay more for any given balance sheet size. Still, a complete fee based financing 
(private funding) can create regulatory capture, with the banks as potential veto players. Moreover, 
during a slow down banks may need more supervision, but have less resources to finance it. The 
latter problem could however be solved by an over-the-cycle budgeting procedure (a fund).    
 
Finally, a combination of public and private financing (mixed funding) is conceivable and might be 
motivated by the consideration that, on the one hand, supervised institutions should pay because the 
supervisor creates the conditions under which they are trusted by the public (depositor protection 
approach), and, on the other hand, the benefits from prudential supervision accrue to society as a 
whole (externalities approach). Moreover, it might be that independence is easier to achieve if the 
supervisor has two sources of funding. 
 
Furthermore, given a particular budget constraint, accountability provisions should ensure that the 
supervisor manages its resources in a cost-effective way.  
                                                 
13 This is easiest if supervisory costs are paid out of seigniorage, in a contract where the profits of the central bank, after 
deduction of expenses, go to the treasury. In this fashion, supervisory costs are so to speak ‘hidden’ in the total expenses 
for monetary policy, the payment system, etc. Therefore it is to be expected that if supervision is taken care of by the 
central bank, it is more likely that financing will come at least partly from the taxpayer through seigniorage. If costs are 
not hidden, the budget may need approval. Finally, it could be that certain expenditures, at a discretionary basis, may be 
vetoed.  
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This section describes the sources of financing of bank supervision in 90 countries.  Before 
identifying how supervision is financed, it is necessary to find out for each country in our sample 
which is the institution that is responsible for carrying out banking supervision. As noted above, the 
architecture of financial supervision has undergone important changes in a number of countries, 
while it is, in other countries, an issue that is discussed by policy makers and academics alike.
14 
Therefore, this section first identifies the bank supervisory authorities in the countries of our 
dataset.
 15 Second, it presents empirical data on the financing sources – public, private or mixed – of 
financial supervision. As shown below, there seems to be a correlation between the institutional 
design of supervision on the one hand, and the financing of banking supervision on the other. 
 
As we have noted in the introduction, our analysis is limited to banking supervision. However, as 
noted below, countries that have a supervisory agency outside the central bank have usually 
combined the tasks of banking, insurance, securities and sometimes pension fund supervision in one 
institution.  
 
The Architectures of Financial Supervision: Banking Supervision  
The reform of the financial supervisory architectures has taken (and takes) place in the context of 
growing vertical, horizontal and international integration of the banking, securities and insurance 
industries (financial blurring effect). Until recently, in fact, it was easy to distinguish the three 
financial sectors in most countries, and the organization for the supervision of financial 
intermediaries also followed a “sectoral” model, so that (at least) one supervisor corresponded to 
each sector. The blurring of distinctions between financial markets, instruments and providers of 
financial services (conglomeration) made the “sectoral” model obsolete, revealing its risks in terms 
of effectiveness, due to the possibility of regulatory arbitrage, and efficiency, due to the costs of 
controls for the regulated entities and diseconomies for the regulators.  
 
As a result of these phenomena, a wave of reforms of financial supervision architectures has taken 
place since the second half of the 1990´s. The wave of reforms reached its peak so far in 2003, 
with eight countries reforming their institutional design of financial supervision. Changes have 
taken place from the traditional model based upon financial sectors (banking, insurance and 
securities) towards two distinct types of models: a goal based model or "twin peaks", adopted in 
the Netherlands, where the organization of the regime is driven by what the organization is trying 
                                                 
14 The link between banking crisis, supervisor’s reputation failure and reform of   the supervision architecture in the 
case of Estonia, Latvia, Korea and United Kingdom is described in Masciandaro (2005).  
15 For a review of the trend in supervisory architectures see Masciandaro (2004).  11 
to achieve- e.g. macro prudential and micro prudential stability on the one hand and investor 
protection on the other (see however Crockett, 2000), or a single financial authority (SFA) model, 
in which the supervision of the three sectors is entrusted to a single authority responsible for 
complying with the aforementioned objectives (e.g. among others Austria, Germany, Japan, 
Sweden and UK). The different architectures for the supervision of financial intermediaries have 
advantages and disadvantages, which have been recently examined in the academic literature and 
which we will not describe in this paper.
16   
 
Note, that the emergence of a single authority is the ultimate and most visible outcome of a more 
general and gradual process of unification and integration of financial supervision. This differs 
from country to country in its speed and degree of unification. Thus, even where full integration or 
another major change in the architectural design may not have been accomplished, supervisory 
authorities have in general moved towards more co-operation.  
 
Our first goal is to see whether we can find a pattern in the responsibilities for banking supervision 
and the degree of concentration of financial supervision. For this purpose we use two indices 
developed by Masciandaro (2004, 2005, 2006). The first is the Financial Authorities Concentration 
Index (FAC) which is based on the number of authorities that supervise the three  traditional 
financial sectors - banking, securities, insurance – in any given country in our sample. Of course, 
developments in financial technology have made the distinction between these types of institutions 
sectors and their products to a certain degree obsolete (Merton 1995), Merton and Bodie 2005). 
This is one of the reasons why many countries have chosen for integrated supervision, or for 
functional supervision.    
 
The second index aims at identifying quantitatively the role of the central bank  in banking 
supervision. Central banks traditionally have the role of lender of last resort, and in this way they 
contribute to stability of the banking sector. However, in addition the central bank may or may not 
be involved in the prudential supervision of banks. We measure the central bank involvement in 
prudential banking supervision  by using the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA 
Index) constructed by Masciandaro (2004, 2005, 2006). The CBFA Index  gives the degree of 
involvement of the central bank in supervision. In 55 countries of our sample banking supervision is 
carried out by the central bank, whereas in 35 countries it is entrusted to an agency outside the 
central bank. 
                                                 
16 Taylor, M. (1995); Abrams and Taylor (2000); Di Giorgo, di Noia and Piatti (2000), Lannoo (2002) and Nieto and 
Peñalosa (2004). 12 
 
Using these two indices each national supervisory model  can be characterised by the degree of 
concentration of supervision (FAC Index) and the degree of involvement of the central bank in 
supervision (CBFA Index). For details about these indices including their construction and the 
values for the countries in our sample, we refer to Masciandaro (2004, 2005, 2006). (For the dataset 
of countries and their abbreviations as used in the figures below, see the Appendix) For the purpose 
of our paper, it suffices to see whether there is a relationship between the indices. The answer is 
yes, as is illustrated by Figure 1, which  gives the FAC index on the vertical  axis, and the CBFA 
index on the horizontal axis. As Figure 1 reveals,. the two most frequent institutional arrangements 
of financial supervision are polarized. There are on the one hand countries with a high concentration 
of supervision and low central bank involvement (Single Financial Authority regime), in which all 
financial supervision is in the hands of one financial supervisor. On the other, countries with a low 
concentration of supervision  (multiple supervisors)  and heavy involvement of the central bank 
(Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors model). To complete this picture, there are some 
countries with both low supervisory concentration and low central bank involvement, in which the 
banking supervision is managed by a specialized institution, and very few countries with a de facto 
monopolist central bank. In sum, there seems to be a trade-off between the degree of supervisory 
concentration and the degree of central bank involvement.  
 
A small group of countries have adopted a banking-and-insurance supervisor, while others have a 
banking-and-securities authority. Finally, in some countries the banking sector is supervised, for 


















Figure 1:  Concentration of supervision (FAC Index)  and involvement of the central bank in 
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Financing Rules of Banking Supervision  
Having identified who is responsible for banking supervision in the countries of our sample – the 
central bank, another single authority for banking supervision, or a separate integrated financial 
supervisor, we now turn to the financing structure of banking supervision.  
 
The source of financing of banking supervision may come directly (budget assigned by 
government) or indirectly (seignorage) from tax payers. Alternatively, prudential supervision may 
be financed by the regulated sector. Finally, financing of supervision may come from both sources. 
On the basis of the information that we have gathered Figures 2 and 3 give an overview of the 14 
financing sources of banking supervision. Figure 2 provides a picture of the financing regime of the 
supervisory effort in countries where the central bank is responsible for supervision. In our dataset, 
this applies to 35 c ountries. It  clearly shows that full public financing is the most common 
budgetary arrangement where central banks are banking supervisors.  this is the case in 30 of the 35 
countries where the central bank supervises the banking sector. Three countries apply mixed public-
private funding of banking supervision by the central bank, and in  two countries the banking 
supervision activities of the central bank are fully privately financed.  
 
Figure 2 



















Note: for country abbreviations, see the Appendix, Table A 
 
Figure 3 presents a different picture. It shows the funding of banking supervision carried out by 
separate supervisors – be it integrated financial supervisors, or a separate banking supervisory 
authority. As Figure 3  clearly shows, separate supervisors  are more  often  financed by  the 
supervised sector (23 out of a total of 37 countries) than by the tax payer (8 out of 37 countries). 
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it is fully funded from the central government budget (IMF 2003a).
17 As Figure 3 also shows, 
mixed public/private funding applies to a minority of 6 separate supervisors.  
 
Figure 3 
The funding of separate authorities as banking supervisors  























Both public and private funding may have different characteristics. Public funding may come from 
using part of the profit coming from seignorage to finance supervisory activities, or from a specific 
earmarked budget provided by the treasury. The characteristics of private funding may differ too. 
For example, they may or may not depend on bank size, supervisory intensity, etc  
 
Our survey results reveal that in countries where central banks are responsible for supervision, 
seigniorage is often the only source of financing of banking supervision. There are exceptions, 
however. In two countries, notably Hong-Kong, and Slovenia, the supervision carried out by the 
central bank is fully financed by banks. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) funds its 
supervisory activities by license fees collected from supervised institutions. The budget is approved 
by the government. The HKMA absorbs, if needed, the deficit not covered by the license fees. In 
Slovenia, banks pay an annual fee based on risk weighted assets. In addition, banks pay penalty fees 
when on-site examinations reveal irregularities. Penalty fees are calculated as a multiple of the 
                                                 
17 In germany, both the Bafin and the Bundesbank supervise the banks. As th Bafin is the most important authority, we 
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number of hours examiners have used to examine the penalized institution and the hourly fee for 
examiners´ work according to the tariffs of the Bank of Slovenia. The Bank of Slovenia informs to 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia about its annual financial statements and its 
financial plan. One explanation of the tax-financing regime prominent in countries where the central 
bank supervises the banking sector is that the (taxpayers) money is there thanks to seignorage, 
hence no explicit fundimng activities are needed. Although this may be efficient, it certainly is not 
deliberately chosen on the basis of  considerations of supervision quality. 
There are some notable differences in characteristics between countries with private financing. In 
the UK the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is financed by fees charged to the regulated 
community. The budget is decided upon by the FSA itself. The fees are of three types. There are 
application fees, which are a contribution to the cost of processing application of new firms 
seeking authorization or variations in their permission. Second, there are annual fees – they are the 
most important financing source - based on the size of supervised firms and the costs of regulation 
such as the implementation of EU Directives.
18 Third, the FSA charges special project fees for 
regulatory work performed primarily for the benefit of a single firm or small group of firms (FSA, 
2006). In Sweden, the cost distribution is primarily based on time spent on certain categories of 
institutions and secondly based on the size of institutions. The budget is proposed by the 
government and decided upon by the parliament. Bank supervision may also be financed by both 
taxpayers and supervised institutions. This is the case in Ireland and the Netherlands. These 
countries all have their central banks taking care of prudential supervision of banks (although in 
the Netherlands the supervisory division within de Nederlandsche Bank has a legal status that 
differs from the monetary division). In Ireland, seignorage amounts to 50% of the financing of the 
Irish Financial  Services Authority. In the Netherlands, a separate budget is established for the 
supervisory branch within the central bank. Of this separate budget, 35% is funded by the 
government; the remainder is funded by the private sector.  
Most central banks that carry out prudential supervision of banks in our sample have a budgeting 
process for their supervisory activities that is identical to that of the central bank. This is  why in 
Ireland the Irish Financial Services Authority, in spite of being a separate body within the legal  
                                                 
18  See FSA press release on regulatory fees and levies 2006/2007; 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2006/009.shtml 17 
entity of the Central Bank of Ireland, shares the same budgeting process. On the contrary, the 
Dutch central bank has a separate budgetary approach for supervisory activities.
19 
 
4.    Financial Accountability Arrangements for Banking Supervisors 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that financing practices of banking supervision differs 
between countries. Assuming that the financing regime may have implications for supervisory 
independence and policy, it is worthwhile to study the accountability arrangements, and more 
specifically the budgetary accountability, in the various countries of our sample that responded to 
the survey conducted via the BIS governance network.  
 
In fact, independence (including the financial independence) of unelected officials such as 
prudential supervisors might be reconciled with democratic legitimacy through accountability. 
Accountability requires  "at the very least that the agency explain and justify its actions and 
decisions and give account in the execution of its responsibilities" (Lastra  and  Shams,  2001). 
Furthermore, accountability goes beyond giving information. It also involves motivating the policy 
actions of the supervisor in the light of his mandate and/or social welfare.  
 
At first sight, it would seem optimal from the point of society to have stricter accountability 
arrangements vis-à-vis society where supervisors have more independence – including financial 
independence  - from the policy maker. On the other hand, if the banking sector finances 
supervision, it may demand accountability, but one might argue that there is less of an incentive for 
the policy maker to set strict accountability standards. However, the latter reasoning may not hold, 
as it is in the general interest to prevent regulatory capture of the supervisor by the banking sector. 
Hence in our opinion it is an open question whether, from the viewpoint of social welfare, the 
financing regime would have unambiguous implications for the accountability regime   
 
As stated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), good governance calls for supervisors (central 
banks and separate supervisors) to be accountable, particularly where monetary and financial 
authorities are granted a high degree of autonomy (IMF 1999). This section describes firstly the 
accountability practices related to the financial accounts and secondly the general accountability 
                                                 
19 In the Netherlands, the organizational budget is split in two parts, one for the DNB as a central bank and one for DNB 
as a prudential supervisor. The budget for supervisory duties of the DNB is drawn up by the DNB after consultation 
with panels consisting of representatives of supervised institutions. The budget is endorsed by the DNB Supervisory 
Board and, submitted for approval to the Ministers of Finance and of Social Affairs (to the latter because of pension 
supervision duties) .   18 
arrangements toward government, parliament, the banking industry and the end users of banking 
services. Our data are collected both by our own questionnaire and through a questionnaire 
distributed by the Governance Network of the Bank for International Settlements. Details on 
accountability procedures are presented in the Appendix.    
 
Financial accountability 
The most common instrument of accountability is the presentation of financial accounts.  
Supervisors generally present their financial accounts with pre-announced schedules either because 
they are required by law or because they choose to do so. Japan, where the supervisors do not 
publish any financial statement, is an exception to the general financial accountability practices 
explained by the lack of budgetary independence of the SFA (IMF 2003a). In Finland, where the 
specialized banking authority is a part of the Central Bank of Finland and, as such, it does not have 
separate accounts, the SFA is not obliged by law to publish its financial accounts.  
 
In the case of prudential supervisors within CBs and financed exclusively by seigniorage, the 
budgeting process and financial statements are in general those of the central bank. They also share 
financial statements in the case of prudential supervisors financed by supervised institutions that 
operate within CBs and, as a consequence, do not have separate assets and liabilities.   
 
For example, in the Netherlands the budgetary processes of the CB and the supervisory activities 
are different. The CB as prudential supervisor, however, does not publish a separate account from 
the CB. In Ireland, the SFA under the umbrella of the Central Bank of Ireland chooses to publish 
only the income and expenditure statement of supervisory activities. Also, in Finland, the 
specialized unit only publishes the yearly budget and the income statement of supervision.  In other 
countries such as Hong Kong and Slovenia, the authorities do not disclose revenues and costs of 
financial supervision.   
Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor (2005) argue that financial accountability should be limited to the 
review of the annual accounts and balance sheets by independent auditors. This is a widely accepted 
practice among SFAs and CBs although, as mentioned above, in the latter case, the accounts of the 
supervisory activity are generally integrated with those of the central bank.
20 The SFA of Germany 
seems to be an exception to this rule, since the budgets of the BaFin area publicly disclosed on its 
website but so far it has not published any audited execution reports of the budgets (IMF 2003b).  
 
                                                 
20 The CBs within EMU are required to present audited annual accounts according to the European System of Central 
Banks Statue (art. 26.4).  19 
In most cases, supervisors are required by law to present independently audited financial statements 
but, in some countries such as Ireland and the US, the authorities choose to do so but are not legally 
required. In Ireland, the Central Bank of Ireland is audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
and a government appointed private sector firm (IMF 2001). In the Netherlands, the annual audit 
report must be signed by all members of the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council and 
submitted to the government in its capacity of sole shareholder. In Spain, the audited accounts of 
the CB which also include those of the supervisory activities, once approved by the government are 
sent to parliament for information. In the UK, the Treasury may commission independent financial 
reviews of the FSA operation (Lastra and Shams, 2001). In Sweden, the SFA gives account of its 
operations and performance in its Annual Report, which is subject to independent review by the 
Swedish National Audit Office (IMF 2002). 
 
The annual report is the most common mean of disclosure of the annual audited accounts.  
Nonetheless, a number of countries also use other means such as the official documents (Austria, 
Spain and the US) and/or public releases to the media (Belgium, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and 
US). SFAs generally disclose detailed information on operating expenses and revenues of their 
supervisory activity and also publish decisions on warnings and fees with respect to individual 
banks. In general, CBs do not seem obliged by law to separate the operating expenses and revenues 
of their prudential supervisory activity. In Ireland, the SFA under the Central Bank of Ireland’s 
umbrella chooses to do so. Nonetheless, a number of CBs with prudential supervisory responsibility 
such as those in Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the US do publish decisions on warnings 
and fees with respect to individual banks.  
 
In addition to the external audit, another form of financial accountability may be ensured by an 
internal audit that provides assurance to the Board and/or Parliament that the fit for purpose internal 
control framework is maintained and operated by the management responsible for prudential 
supervision. Although, not as conspicuously used as the external audit, the internal audit function 
does exist both in the case of SFAs and CBs although in the latter case, it is shared with the central 
bank functions.  In the UK, the Business Review and Audit Division of the FSA reports to the 
Board, while in the US, the inspector general to all major agencies, including the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, conducts independent and objective audits and other 
reviews and reports both to the head of the Agency and Congress.
21  
 
                                                 
21 U.K.: FSA (2004), and U.S: Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor (2005). 20 
Table B in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of the financial accountability of banking 
supervisors in selected countries 
 
General accountability 
Regarding the general accountability arrangements, these vary in terms of accountors as well as 
regarding the content and form. While the Parliament and government are the most obvious 
accountors, arrangements that also include other groups such as the supervised institutions and the 
public at large are becoming more common.  
 
The accountability to the parliament is aimed at determining whether the powers delegated to the 
supervisor are exercised effectively according to the mandate and at providing a communication 
channel to amend legislation (Hupkes, Quintyn and Taylor, 2005). Figures 4 and 5 picture the 
accountability for central banks and separate banking supervisors separately, distinguishing 
between accountability to the parliament and accountability to the government. As Figure 5 shows, 
7 out of our dataset of 37 countries in which the central bank is involved in banking supervision are 
explicitly accountable to both the parliament and the government, 16 are explicitly accountable to 
the parliament only, and 11 are explicitly accountable only to the government. Finally, two 
countries have no accountability for the central bank involved in banking supervision to either 
parliament or government. Figure 6 shows, that out of the 18 countries in our sample where banks 
are supervised by a separate institution 6 are accountable to the parliament and the government, 10 
to the government only and 2 to the parliament only. Hence all separate supervisors in our sample 
are accountable to either parliament or government or both.     
 
The general picture that emerges is therefore the following. Central banks as banking supervisors 
are more likely to be accountable to the parliament than are the separate banking supervisors. Note, 
however, that  the central banks are often accountable for their  activities  in general, and not 
specifically for prudential supervision. Spain is an exception since according to the law the Annual 
Supervision Report shall be submitted to Parliament. In Ireland, the SFA under the umbrella of the 
CB is accountable to the parliament for its supervisory and regulatory activities. In Finland and 
Belgium, the separate supervisors are accountable to the parliament by law. In the UK, the separate 
financial supervisor is indirectly accountable to Parliament through the Treasury, which submits to 
Parliament the FSA’s  annual report. 
 21 
Accountability to the government should be aimed at informing about developments in the financial 
sector and about regulations to be implemented by the banking sector (Hupkes, Quintyn and Taylor, 
2005). Accountability arrangements differ between countries also with regard to the type of 
information to be presented. While separate supervisors included in the sample are accountable to 
the government in all cases, approximately 50% of the central banks included in the survey are not 
accountable to government.  The most common arrangements are regular reports to the Treasury or 
other members of government (UK, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden); reporting 
of proposals of new regulations (Belgium) and /or the representation of government in the oversight 
boards (Belgium, UK, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden). In Germany, 
the BaFin is subject to the legal and supervisory control of the Minister of Finance. In Japan, the 
minister of financial affairs is "de facto" in charge of managing the separate financial supervisor, 
creating scope for the supervisor to be subject to political pressures (IMF, 2003b).  
 
Figure 4 Supervision Accountability: Central Banks that are banking supervisors 
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Figure 5 Supervision Accountability: separate banking supervisors 



















In addition to accountability to the public through public institutions (parliament, government), 
there may be explicit accountability to the banking industry and end users of banking services. This 
should be aimed at enhancing public confidence in the financial supervisor and at increasing the 
acceptability and effectiveness of the supervisory process; regardless of the fact that the prudential 
supervisors be financed partially or entirely by the supervised institutions (Hupkes, Quintyn and 
Taylor, 2005).     
 
We have some anecdotical evidence about accountability to the industry for a subset of countries 
only (See Table 1).
22 From this the following picture emerges. In some cases, accountability to the 
supervised industry is required by law. This is the case for both separate supervisors (UK, Sweden 
and Belgium) and for central banks (Netherlands, Spain and Portugal). In the UK, the law requires 
the F SA to establish and maintain consumers´ and practitioners´ panels to consult with the 
supervised institutions and end users of financial services (Lastra and Shams, 2001). In Sweden, the 
basic constitutional principle is that all types of official documents are to be publicly available, with 
                                                 
22 When this paper was already in print, a study by Quintyn, Loyda Ramirez and Taylor (2007) was published on 
changes in accountability and independence of financial supervisors. 
Accountability to 
Government 
Accountability to Parliament 
























FI (ind), CH 23 
very limited exceptions as defined in the Secrecy Act. Moreover, the accountability requirements of 
the separate supervisor are stipulated by a law that prescribes the form of annual reporting and 
financial statements required of all government agencies (IMF, 2002). In Spain and Portugal, where 
supervision is fully financed by seigniorage, the Bank of Spain is required by law to be accountable 
to the banking sector and the Bank of Portugal is also legally required to be accountable to the 
consumers of financial services. Moreover, even in those cases in which such accountability 
arrangements are not required by law, the supervisor (either central bank or separate authority)  
often chooses to be accountable to the banking sector and/or consumers (US, Germany, Ireland and 
Finland). The most common forms of this type of accountability are the public mission statements, 
regular reports on supervisory activities and consultation of new legislation, all of which are often 
made available on their web sites. The Netherlands publishes a Quarterly Bulletin and uses its web 
site to announce some of its decisions. In Ireland, the supervisor is not required by law to be 
accountable to the supervised institutions and end users; however, it chooses to consult with the 
consumer and industry panels prior to the introduction or amendment of supervisory policies.  
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 




Accountability to the industry required by law:     UK, Spain, Portugal 
 
Accountability to financial consumers required by law:   Portugal 
 
Accountability to industry and/or         US, Germany, Ireland, Finland,  




In sum, there seems to be positive relation between the public source of financing and the 
accountability to Parliament aimed at determining whether the powers delegated to the supervisor 
are exercised according to the mandate. Nonetheless, there are exceptions such as Finland, 
Slovenia, Belgium and Ireland where the prudential supervisory activities are either fully (Finland, 
Slovenia, Belgium) or partially (Ireland) financed by the supervised entities and the banking 
supervisor is also accountable to Parliament.  At the same time, there seems to be a relation between 
the private source of financing and the accountability to government with the purpose of informing 24 
about developments in the financial sector and about regulations to be implemented by the banking 
sector.  In spite of being fully financed by the industry, in Finland supervisors are not accountable 
to government.    
 
 
5.   Future work  
 
This paper has focused on finding general patterns in the financing regime of financial supervision, 
notably banking supervision. In a follow-up we will use our data for a cross-country econometric 
analysis aimed at identifying explanatory variables of the chosen financing regimes. A potential 
determinant of the financing structure of supervision is the financial structure in a country. In a 
bank-based regime the policymaker has a stronger incentives to establish public funding to increase 
the probability to be the veto player, in order to prevent the risk of regulatory capture by supervised 
firms. Along the same lines, the degree of concentration of the financial sector may matter. A more 
concentrated banking sector may imply the danger of regulatory capture by a well organised and 
powerful interest group. Another determinant may be the degree of conglomeration and the scale of 
cross-border activities of the banking sector. Also, the quality of governance of political institutions 
may affect the actual as well as the optimal financing rule. An analysis into the determinants of the 
financing structure of supervision should therefore take an indicator of  good governance into 
account. It may also be useful to distinguish between developed and developing countries, e.g. by 
dividing the country sample into OECD and non-OECD countries.  
 
There are other qualitative variables that may be used to try to explain the characteristics of the 
financing structure.
23  The law-cum-finance literature states that there is a strong relationship 
between market-oriented financial systems and common law jurisdictions. English law is assumed 
to protect the individual investor more than does the French and German code.
24 Besides, the 
dynamic law and finance view emphasizes  that legal traditions differ in terms of their abilities to 
adapt to changing environments, and that common law is more dynamic (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, 2001).
 This might imply that in common law countries, rules and regulations respond 
more promptly to changing financial structures. 
 
                                                 
23For example, in Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2003) regulation become insignificant in explaining banking 
performance when checking for institutional indicators. 
24 For a survey see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). 25 
Finally, for several reasons a  geographical factor might be important in explaining the 
supervisors’ financing rule. Europe has witnessed important reforms of the national financial 
architectures over the past decade. Cross border activities of the financial sector within a region 
may have prompted a response by policy makers. The establishment of the European Central Bank 
and the common currency in 12 neighbouring countries has triggered a debate about harmonisation 
and centralisation of financial supervision. Finally, recent literature emphasizes the role of 
geography in shaping institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Hence through peer 
group effects the choice of supervision financing may mimic that of neighbouring countries.
25 
 
The history of both the institutional development of supervision and that of financial stability may 
also play a role. For example, in those instances in which insurance supervision was traditionally 
developed bottom up and therefore financed by the supervised firms, it is more likely that a 
conglomerated financial sector will have at least some private funding of supervision. Moreover, it 
could be that countries with an international financial sector are more subject to peer group 
pressure to choose a particular type of financing. Finally, large scale financial scandals may have 
affected the monitoring of supervisory activities by the government, including budgetary 
monitoring and the financing rule.  
 
 
6.   Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented a cross-country comparison of the financing regime of banking 
supervision. Based on the existing data, the conclusion is justified that the different financing 
regimes do not seem to have been chosen deliberately with the purpose of either having the 
beneficiaries pay for supervision, or of creating incentive-compatibility and reducing the risk of 
regulatory or industry capture by the supervisor. We have been able to discover a pattern in the 
choice of financing, however, as there seems to be a correlation between the financing regime on 
the one hand and the institutional design of supervision on the other. Where central banks are the 
supervisor, public funding is more likely, whereas the bill of a separate supervisor is in most cases 
paid by the regulated industry. Moreover, there seems to be a trend toward (partially) private 
financing, as countries where supervisory authorities have been recently established and countries 
that have recently changed their supervisory structure have, as a rule, introduced private funding. It 
might be that the correlation between the institutional design and the financing regime is due to a 
                                                 
25 Masciandaro (2005) and (2006) tests a legal neighbour effect in explaining the overall supervision architectures. 26 
third factor: the date of establishment or change of the institutional structure, perhaps reflecting a 
changing view on the role of the government vis-à-vis the private sector. We also observe a 
relationship between sources of financing and accountability arrangements. Public financing is 
more often associated with accountability towards Parliament, while private financing seems to go 
hand in hand with accountability towards the government.  
 
Further analysis is required to see whether the choice of funding of banking supervision is 
deliberate, or whether it is a more or less accidental result of historical developments.  Reflecting on 
whether the development of the financial supervision architecture is deliberately designed or 
accidental, Goodhart (2004) defends that the design of supervision is essentially reactive, lagging 
behind innovation and evolving risks, and that the reasons for supervisory reforms are largely 
political. Goodhart does not include the financing structure, but his reasoning might equally apply 
to the financing regime of supervision.
26 One would like to see that the choice of funding is 
deliberately aimed at maximizing the quality and efficiency of supervision and hence fostering 
social welfare, but we doubt whether this holds in practice. The alternative is that the financing 
structure is a more or less casual, path dependent variable, or that it is chosen on the basis of 
political rent-seeking.    
 
From the methodological point of view, the fact that no theoretical optimal budgetary model has 
been developed may lead to different conclusions. It could be that society believes that financing 
rules do not matter and that these rules are chosen or have developed randomly. The alternative is 
that the financing model of supervision depends on country specific circumstances. Further analysis 
of the rules as well as their association with the accountability arrangements of bank supervision is 
needed to understand differences in and developments of the financial governance of supervision.  
 
                                                 
26 The concept of rules driven path dependence has been recently used in the corporate governance literature: see, 
among others, Bebchuk and Roe (1999), Clark and Wojcik (2003).  27 
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Table A: Countries and their abbreviations as used in the paper 
 
 
Albania            AL 
Argentina        AR 
Australia         AU 
Austria            AT 
Bahamas        BS 
Belarus         BY 
Belgium   BE 
Bolivia   BO 
Bosnia   BA 
Botswana   BW 
Brazil   BR 
Bulgaria   BG 
Cameroon   CM 
Canada   CA 
Chile   CL 
China   CN 
Colombia   CO 
Costa Rica   CR 
Croatia   HR 
Cyprus   CY 
Czech Republic   CZ 
Denmark    DK 
Ecuador   EC 
Egypt   EG 
El Salvador   SV 
Estonia   EE 
Finland   FI 
France   FR 
Georgia   GE 
Germany   DE 
Greece   GR 
Guatemala   GT 
Hong Kong   HK 
Hungary   HU 
Iceland   IS 
India   IN 
Iran   IR 
Ireland   IE 
Israel   IL 
Italy   IT 
Jamaica   JM 
Japan   JP 
Jordan   JO 
Kazakhstan   KZ 
Kenya   KE 
Korea   KR 
Latvia   LV 
Lebanon   LB 
Libya   LY 
Lithuania   LT 
Luxembourg   LU 
Macedonia   MK 
Malaysia   MY 
Malta   MT 
Mauritius   MU 
Mexico   MX 
Moldovia  MD 
Morocco   MA 
Netherlands   NL 
New Zealand   NZ 
Nicaragua   NI 
Norway   NO 
Pakistan   PK 
Panama   PA 
Peru   PE 
Philippines   PH 
Poland   PL 
Portugal   PT 
Romania   RO 
Russia   RU 
Saudi Arabia   SA 
Slovak Republic   SK 
Slovenia   SL 
South Africa   ZA 
Spain   ES 
Sri Lanka   LK 
Sweden   SE 
Switzerland   CH 
Thailand   TH 
Trinidad Tobago   TT 
Tunisia (  TN 
Turkey   TR 
Ukraine   UA 
UAE   AE 
UK   GB 
USA   US 
Uruguay   UY 
Venezuela  VE 
Vietnam   VN 

















chooses to publish 



























to disclose audited 
financial statements 
by an independent 
auditor




and revenues of 
financial agencies by 
law
The prudential 
supervisor chooses to 
disclose information on 
operating expenses and 
revenues of financial 
agencies
Does the banking 
prudential supervisor 
publish decisions on 
warnings, fees and other 
measures (other than 
bank closure/revoking of 
license) with respect to 
individual banks?
SFA
Belgium 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 0 1(P&L) 1 1 1 (cb) 1 1
Japan 1(cg)
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB
Argentina 1 (cb) 1 1 1 (cb) 0 0 1
Austria 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 0 1 (cb) 1(cb) 0
Brazil 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 1 1 (cb) 0 1
Czech Rep. 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 1 (cb) 0 0 0
Germany 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 (cb) 1(cb) 0
Hong Kong 1(cb) 1 1 1 1 1(cb) 0 0(no statutory powers)
Ireland 1 (cb) 1(P&L) 1 1 1(cb) 1 1
Israel 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 1(cb) 0 0 0
Netherlands 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 (cb) 1(cb) 1
New Zealand 1 (cb) 0 1 1 1 1 1 (cb) 0 0 0
Poland 1 (cb) 0 1 (cb) 0
Portugal 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 1 (cb) 1(cb) 1
Slovenia 1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 (cb) 0 0
Spain  1 (cb) 1 1 1 1 (cb) 0 0 0
USA 1 (cb) 1 1 1 0 1(cb) 1(cb) 1
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